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Executive Summary 
Key Observations  
 
• Globalization, technological complexity, interdependence, terrorism, climate and 
energy volatility, and pandemic potential are increasing the level of risk that 
societies and organizations now face. Risks also are increasingly interrelated; 
disruptions in one  area can cascade in multiple directions. 
 
• The ability to manage emerging risks, anticipate the interactions between different 
types of risk, and bounce back from disruption will be a competitive differentiator 
for companies and countries alike in the 21st century. 
 
What Policymakers Should Know 
 
The national objective is not just homeland protection, but economic resilience: the 
ability to mitigate and recover quickly from disruption. Businesses must root the case for 
investment in resilience strategies to manage a spectrum of risks, not just catastrophic 
ones. 
 
Making a business case for investment in defenses against low-probability events (even 
those with high impact) is difficult. However, making a business case for investments 
that assure business continuity and shareholder value is not a heavy lift. 
 
There are an infinite number of disruption scenarios, but only a finite number of 
outcomes. Leading organizations do not manage specific scenarios, rather they create the 
agility and flexibility to cope with turbulent situations. 
 
The investments and contingency plans these leading companies make to manage a 
spectrum of risk create a capability to respond to high- impact disasters as well. 
 
Government regulations tend to stovepipe different types of risk, which impedes 
companies’ abilities to manage risk in an integrated way. Policies to strengthen risk 
management capabilities would serve both security and competitiveness goals. 
 
What CEOs and Boards Should Know 
Operational risks are growing rapidly and outpacing many companies’ abilities to 
manage them. 
 
Corporate leadership has historically viewed operational risk management as a back 
office control function. But managing operational risks increasingly affects real-time 
financial performance. 
 
· The 835 companies that announced a supply chain disruption between 1989 and 
2000 experienced 33 percent to 40 percent lower stock returns than their industry 
peers. 
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· Twenty-five percent of companies that experienced an IT outage of two to six 
days went bankrupt immedia tely. Ninety-three percent of companies that lost their 
data center for 10 days or more fi led for bankruptcy within a year. 
 
A preponderance of board members report that boards are under- informed about 
operational risk. 
 
Lack of collaboration between risk specialties, and lack of consistent and “leading” 
metrics to anticipate emerging or interacting risks, are important gaps in the risk 
management 
 
Priorities for Universities 
 
Learning to Change 
 
· Create cutting-edge, cross-disciplinary resilience curricula and research centers 
 
Priorities for Policymakers  
 
Lead by Incentive 
· Include resilience criteria in procurement and research and development processes 
Reinforce Market Mechanisms.  
· Explore expanded U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure 
requirements on non-financial material risks. 
 
Reduce Risk and Cost for Resilience Solutions 
· Leverage computational capabilities of universities and national laboratories to 
strengthen modeling and simulation of operational risks 
· Catalyze regional networks for crisis management and information exchange 
· Expand technology test beds to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of resilience 
solutions  
 
Invest in Training and Education to Change the Culture 
· Create a Resilience Curriculum Fund to embed resilience in undergraduate and 
professional education 
· Stimulate cross-disciplinary research centers on resilience 
 
Priorities for Business 
Walk the Talk at the Top 
· Inspire cultural transformation 
 
Link Operational Risk to Revenues 
· Organize risk management processes as a continuum 
 
Take a Systems Approach 
· Identify critical vulnerabilities across business assets and operations 
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Manage with Metrics 
· Benchmark risk management performance on the operational side 
 
Harness New Technologies 
· Apply technology solutions, that create early warning and tracking capabilities, as 
well as coordination across the organization. 
 
Create Adaptive Capacity  
· Develop capabilities to mitigate a variety of outcomes from disruptions 
 
Learning to Change 
· Create cutting-edge, cross-disciplinary resilience curricula and research centers 
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The Competitiveness and Security 
Conundrum 
 
Key Findings 
After the shock of 9/11, the Council on 
Competitiveness introduced the 
concept that America’s security is also 
a national competitiveness challenge. 
 
Our economy—the engine of jobs and 
prosperity—could be brought to its 
knees by a well-placed terrorist attack. 
And, for the first time in our nation’s history, its economic assets and infrastructure were 
on the front lines of a battlefield: key targets and even pathways for attack. By the same 
token, however, the economy could suffer an equally damaging blow from excessive 
security measures that stifled productivity and slowed commerce.   
 
The Council and Carnegie Mellon University, in conjunction with The Business 
Roundtable, the National Academies, the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
National Governors Association, convened the first-ever National Symposium on 
Competitiveness and Security. Its goal: to bring together America’s public—and 
private—sector leaders to “Create Opportunity Out of Adversity.” Two hundred and fifty 
national leaders—CEOs from some of America’s largest companies, as well as 
executives from government, labor and academia—gathered in Pittsburgh to share their 
experiences and insights on the right balance between competitiveness and security.   
 
Armed with a powerful and compelling framework, Chad Holliday, the CEO of DuPont, 
and Jerry Cohon, the president of Carnegie Mellon, convened a CEO level steering 
committee to bring unique leadership perspectives on the risk-benefit calculations of 
security investment, and a platform for peer-to-peer advocacy dialogue with senior 
administration officials and congressional leaders.  
 
An expert advisory committee co-chaired by Robert Moore, director of global security 
for Merck, and Catherine Allen, then CEO of BITs, managed a complex sector study 
process that investigated best practices in five industries: chemical, electric and gas 
utilities, financial services, petroleum, and pharmaceutical.   
 
What we learned is that the challenge is not security: it is resilience. 
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What Policymakers Should Know 
It’s a Whole New Ball Game for Risk 
(Irrespective of Terrorism) 
 
Globalization, technological complexity, 
interdependence, and speed are fundamentally 
changing the kind of risks and competitive 
challenges that companies—and countries—face. 
Failure, whether by attack or accident, can spread 
quickly and cascade across networks, borders and 
societies. Increasingly, disruptions can come from 
unforeseen directions with unanticipated effects. 
Global information and transportation networks 
create interdependencies 
that magnify the impact of individual incidents. 
These new types of risk demand new methods of 
risk management. (See “Test Your Risk IQ” at 
right.) 
 
Resilience Trumps Protection 
 
Homeland security is often seen as a protective, 
even defensive, posture. But Maginot lines are 
inherently flawed. Fences and firewalls can 
always be breached. Rather, the national focus 
should be on risk management and resilience, not 
security and protection. Resilience—the capability 
to anticipate risk, limit impact and bounce back rapidly—is the ultimate objective of both 
economic security and corporate competitiveness. 
 
The Business Case Begins with Business Risks  
 
The business case for investment in resilience has to be rooted in meeting a spectrum of 
business risks. It cannot be based solely on the possibility of disaster. In fact, most of the 
investments that lead- ing organizations are making—investments that can run in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars—are aimed at managing the risks they face on a day-to-
day basis. 
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For example, the supply chain flexibility that Wal-Mart pioneered—a capability that 
enabled the company to operate despite the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina—
was not specifically created to cope with catastrophe. Rather, Wal-Mart’s significant 
investments in RFID tags, software, and staging centers were intended to meet the day-
to-day complexities of customer demand. But in the process, Wal-Mart’s supply chain 
resilience also created extraordinary disaster management capabilities. (see “Wal-Mart’s 
Supply Chain Resilience” above) 
 
Regulatory Solutions Often Reinforce Risk Silos 
 
For companies, there are an infinite number of 
disruption scenarios, but only a finite number of 
outcomes. In the end, it does not matter whether power 
failures, floods, strikes or terrorist attacks cause the 
down time. Causes count less than creating the agility 
and flexibility to mitigate risks and manage outcomes. 
 
Government, however, tends to see different categories 
of risk–terrorism and natural disaster, climate change, 
worker safety, governance–as different problems requiring separate sets of regulatory 
solutions.  In today’s risk environment, that creates three potential problems: 
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· First, it often results in a “check the box” response that is at odds with the need to 
create value by managing risk on an enterprise-wide basis. 
· Second, because risks cascade across networks and private enterprises in complex 
ways, risk silos may actually increase risk exposure. 
· Third, it sets up the potential for inconsistent and often overlapping sets of 
regulatory requirements, which raise cost and complexity without actually 
improving outcomes. 
 
What CEOs and Boards Should Know 
 
Enterprise Risk Management is a Competitive Advantage 
Businesses make money by taking risks, but lose money by failing to manage them. A 
study by Deloitte Research indicated that many of the largest losses in value among the 
world’s largest global companies were a result of a failure to manage risk effectively and 
systematically. The study found that most firms were exposed to more than one type of 
risk—whether strategic, operational, market or financial— and failed to manage the 
relationships among these different types of risk. Actions taken to address one type of 
risk had the potential to increase exposure to other types of risk. The failure to manage 
risk on an enterprise basis takes a huge toll. The study found that almost half of the 1000 
largest global companies suffered declines in share prices of more than 20 percent in a 
one-month period between 1994 and 2003, relative to the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) World Index. And the value losses were often long-standing. By the 
end of 2003, share prices for one-quarter of the companies had not recovered to their 
original levels.3 
 
Managing Operational Risks is Key 
The business equivalent to homeland security and critical infrastructure protection is 
operational risk management—a domain that many executives see as the most important 
emerging area of risk for their firms. (See Chart 1, following page) Increasingly, failure 
to plan for operational resilience can have “bet the firm” results. 
 
· Research on supply chain resilience demonstrated that the 835 companies that 
announced a supply chain disruption between 1989 and 2000 experienced 33 
percent to 40 percent lower stock returns than their industry peers, regardless of 
industry, cause of disruption or time period. Such firms experienced 7 percent 
lower sales growth and 11 percent higher costs. Changes in operating income, 
sales, total costs and inventories remained negative in the two years after the 
problems were disclosed.4  
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· 25 percent of companies that experienced an IT outage of two to six days went 
bankrupt immediately. Ninety-three percent of companies that lost their data 
center for 10 days or more filed for bankruptcy within a year.5 
 
Operational Risks Remain Stovepiped and Undermeasured 
 
Different aspects of operational risk—physical and employee security, environmental 
health and safety, IT security, business continuity, disaster management, supply chain 
security, energy supply and quality— are frequently separated from one another within 
the organization, and sometimes de- linked from overall corporate risk management. 
 
On the financial side, there are increasingly sophisticated systems that measure market 
and credit risk— often using sophisticated algorithms and supercomputers to model risk 
exposure. By contrast, although operational risks are arguably at least as complex, 
operational risk exposure tends to be measured by checklists, which are often based on 
experience and instinct. In fact, as Chart 2 on page 13 indicates, boards are not as 
comfortable with their non-financial as their financial risk management. 
 
Industry Continues to Face a Risk of Reactive Regulation 
 
Given that six years have passed since 9/11, it is tempting to believe that the danger of a 
major attack on the United States has abated. Unfortunately, a successful and devastating 
attack on U.S. soil remains the gold standard for global terrorism. To date, efforts to 
regulate security have been incremental and  
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sector-specific. But regulatory incrementalism could become a regulatory tsunami if a 
major attack occurs and industry has not taken the necessary steps to ensure its resilience. 
 
Executive Priorities 
Priorities for CEOs and Boards  
 
Corporate executives need to transform current risk management practices with a vision 
and strategy to implement enterprisewide approaches, and build in the flexibility, agility 
and adaptability that are characteristic of resilient systems. 
 
Walk the Talk at the Top Inspire cultural transformation by creating a vision for the 
enterprisewide resilience approach, connect the organizational silos, and engage the 
entire workforce in risk management. 
 
Link Operational Risk to Revenues Organize risk management processes as a 
continuum—from prevention to profit—to enable consideration of financial trade-offs 
among different approaches. 
 
Take a Systems Approach Identify critical vulnerabilities across business assets and 
operations, including competitive context, and analyze how disruptions might unfold. 
 
Manage with Metrics Benchmark risk management performance on the operational side, 
identify leading rather than lagging indicators, and quantify the effectiveness of 
alternative risk management strategies. 
 
Harness New Technologies Apply technology solutions that create early warning and 
tracking capabilities, as well as coordination across the organization. 
Create Adaptive Capacity Develop capabilities to mitigate a variety of outcomes from 
disruptions, regardless of cause, rather than planning for specific scenarios. 
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Priorities for Universities 
Universities should position themselves to drive new research, knowledge creation and 
educational curricula that will build the theoretical and practical groundwork for a 
resilient economy. 
· Create cutting-edge, cross-disciplinary resilience curricula that prepare students 
for a turbulent, interdependent work environment. 
· Develop interdisciplinary research centers that help government and industry 
respond to the challenges of building resilience. 
· Galvanize local and regional efforts to enhance infrastructure resilience and 
preparedness along with economic development. 
· Communicate the importance of aligning security and competitiveness to policy-
makers, business leaders, and the public. 
 
Priorities for Public Policymakers  
 
Public policy should strive to reduce uncertainty and inconsistency, lead by incentive 
where possible, use market mechanisms more creatively and public-private partnerships 
more effectively, and support education and training programs that change cultures. 
 
Lead By Incentive 
· Leverage the government’s buying clout to embed resilience criteria in the 
procurement selection processes and supply chains. 
· Leverage the government’s investments in technology to embed resilience criteria 
in the evaluation and selection process for emerging technologies. 
 
Leverage Market Incentives More Creatively 
· Expand guidance on disclosure of non-financial material risks in SEC fi lings. 
· Support policies that incentivize risk management through the market rather than 
through prescriptive regulation. 
 
Effective Partnerships: Reduce Risk and Cost 
· Fund additional research to develop sophisticated computational modeling of 
operational risk and quantitative measures of effectiveness in risk management 
processes. 
· Create regional networks to exchange information on infrastructure or system risk 
management, crisis planning and preparedness, non proprietary best practices, and 
intelligence-sharing between the public and private sectors. 
· Expand the program of technology test beds, such as the U.S. Department of 
Energy National SCADA Test Bed, which helps companies test how their current 
operating systems would interface with innovative security solutions. 
 
Education and Training: Change the Culture  
· Establish a Resilience Curriculum Fund under which universities and other 
education/training providers could apply for competitively awarded grants to 
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develop resilience curricula and training programs, either stand-alone or 
embedded in existing curricula. 
· Stimulate cross-disciplinary synthesis of resilience and research at a system level. 
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Seeking the Upside of Security: 
Learning from Five Sectors 
 
The Council’s core insight immediately following 
the events of 9/11 was that the attacks not only had 
critical security repercussions, they also had major 
competitiveness implications. With so much of the 
economic infrastructure owned or operated by the 
private sector, any solution for addressing 
homeland security threats and scalable responses 
would have to come from within business, not 
imposed from the outside.  
 
In response to this insight, the Council launched 
first-of-their-kind studies in five sectors to identify 
a business case for security. The approach was 
grounded in the parallels with integrated quality 
and safety that evolved in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Businesses traditionally viewed both quality and 
safety as cost drivers. But new management and 
organizational approaches transformed them into 
productivity-enablers. 
 
In the same way, the business community historically 
viewed security as a sunk cost, not a strategic opportunity. But if integrated quality and 
safety management systems could become business drivers and pathways for productivity 
growth, why couldn’t the same be true for integrated security management? (see “We’ve 
Been Here Before” at right) Study leaders across the five sectors identified three generic 
approaches to security: 
· Security as the price of doing business (the “as little expense as possible” 
approach) 
· Security as a strategy (standardize across the operation to strengthen security but 
rationalize the cost) 
· Security as a strategic opportunity (seize opportunities to gain multiple benefits 
from security investments) 
 
Security perceptions and practices vary widely from sector to sector; even companies 
within the same industry differ in their security approaches. In general, the financial 
services and oil industries tend to be ahead of the curve in seeing security as part of risk 
management and financial reward. For financial  
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service companies, international agreements, like the Basel Accord, and domestic 
regulatory standards initially motivated the integration of security with 
risk management. The oil industry tends to integrate security into major business 
decisions because of its history of operating in unstable and often unpredictable regions. 
Leaders in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries led the way with voluntary safety 
standards in the 1990s—which expanded after 9/11 to include security. But the 
companies are far from uniform in the way they view security. Similarly, utility firms are 
at varying stages of sophistication in the way security is positioned within their 
companies. (see “Views from the Industry Trenches” on previous page) 
 
But in each of the five sectors studied, there is anecdotal evidence of an upside to security 
that goes beyond mere loss avoidance.  
 
In fact, leadership-class companies are transforming the way they think about—and 
manage—security and risk. Security is “baked into” every process and decision, not 
bolted on with fences and firewalls. An oil company executive noted: 
“The security program has made great strides in establishing security as a 
competitive issue. Security officers routinely take part in discussions involving 
issues such as political risk, country risk and strategic reserves. The capabilities of 
our security program give us a competitive advantage. We operate in countries 
that our competitors cannot.” 
 
Or as a financial services executive remarked: “Security is the support structure for the 
relationship we have with our customers.” 
 
More innovative and enterprisewide security solutions can yield bottom line results, both 
as a productivity- enabler and potentially a profit center. Insight 
into workflow efficiencies, reduced losses from fraud or waste, and savings on insurance 
premiums can create competitive benefi ts that still remain largely uncalculated in many 
companies.   
 
In the chemical sector, firms report that new access control systems can reduce loss (from 
pilferage) and that better time and attendance monitoring—including better monitoring of 
contractor hours—increase productivity. One utility combines automated meter reading 
with a service call system that targets outage locations and reports repair times back to 
customers. 
 
A study by Stanford University, the National Association of Manufacturers and IBM 
found that a funny thing happens on the way to supply chain security. Companies 
discovered increased efficiency, better inventory management, and reduced cycle and 
shipping times. 
 
Some companies are taking advantage of the technologies and capabilities developed for 
security to create whole new business lines. In the financial services sector, a few firms 
actively market security related products and processes to peers. One company in the 
chemical sector is marketing an opensource software system designed to integrate safety, 
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health and security-related information. At Waste Management, an integrated security 
center has not only streamlined costs, it is becoming a profit center for the company. (See 
“Innovation at Waste Management” below.) 
 
 
 
For some of the leading organizations, the added confidence in the brand, shareholder 
value, customer satisfaction and employee confidence, though less easy to quantify, also 
are significant aspects of the value proposition from security. Chart 3 on the following 
page lays out a framework of the prospective business benefits from security. 
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Why Companies May Not Recognize the Business Benefits of Security 
Despite the prospective bottom-line benefits from security, most companies have not 
moved creatively to capture them. Many continue to see security as a necessary function, 
but not a core business value. Organizationally, the security function is often 
disconnected from business continuity and business drivers. Few companies have 
developed consistent metrics to quantify cost, benefits or performance. The five sector 
studies highlighted that the barriers to the business case are often organizational and 
cultural—a product of the way in which companies have historically positioned security. 
Looking across the sectors, there are common patterns that capture some of these critical 
barriers. 
 
· Security Is Not Linked to Strategic Planning and Risk Management. 
Security in many of the sectors was not aligned with business strategy and not 
integrated into strategic planning, product development, engineering risk 
management or supply chain management.  Indeed, the security function often 
does not report at the same level as other senior managers, resulting in what one 
executive called “security by obscurity”. 
 
· MIA: Metrics for Success 
In most companies, metrics to capture the value of the security function to the 
enterprise are unavailable, anecdotal or inconsistent. The lack of a framework to 
demonstrate efficiency gains, reduced theft or fraud, new business opportunities 
or new markets is a critical barrier. The inability to measure value reinforces the 
conventional perception that security is an overhead cost rather than a core 
business enabler. And, it impedes the ability to develop market-based standards 
by which ratings agencies or the insurance companies could assess different types 
of security risks. 
 
· Security Functions Are Stovepiped  
In a number of companies, different aspects of security are siloed by function: 
physical and employee security; supply chain secur ity; IT security; and IP 
security. The practical consequences of security silos is that companies within a 
sector find it difficult to agree on cross-cutting best practices.  Between sectors, 
the existence of different organizational silos bogs down efforts to reduce the 
risks that stem from infrastructure interdependencies.  Lack of a common lingo 
makes it harder to partner effectively with each other or with federal, state, and 
local governments—or even to demonstrate to Congress and the American public 
that companies are exercising due diligence. 
 
· Security Executives: Company Cops or Global Risk Managers? 
Unlike most other C-Suite positions, the roles and respons ibilities of chief 
security officers are not well defined. They can range from company cop (viewed 
with suspicion) to global risk manager (where no business decision is made 
without a security sign-off). Reporting often goes through the Office of the 
General Counsel (where the focus is on compliance) or through Human Relations 
(where the focus is on guards with guns). 
 20 
 
· Culture Wars: Linking Security to the Language of Risk and Reward 
Many chief security executives come out of law enforcement, often with 
distinguished 30-year careers. That makes them exceedingly well equipped to 
catch crooks, but often less conversant with how to demonstrate the value of 
security to the overall enterprise. And they need to be able to speak the language 
of risk and reward when they’re competing for investment capital. By the same 
token, business executives do not typically speak the language of security. 
 
 
· Lack of Worker Training as the First Line of Defense 
Integrating security across the enterprise requires a culture that includes workers 
as a first line of defense. But few of the companies in the studies had taken steps 
to engage workers in securing the enterprise. Incidents were not always formally 
reported. In some cases, it took days before security executives were even aware 
that an incident had occurred. Given advances in IT and software, automated 
tracking systems are relatively simple to institute, create a valuable learning tool 
and could be a key component in developing the quantitative models to measure 
security risk and performance. Similarly, many companies lack the training 
programs to achieve a cultural transformation.  In leader organizations, training is 
detailed, role-specific, automated and required at regular intervals. But this is the 
exception rather than the rule. 
 
· Learning to Change: Education and Research 
Professional curricula largely ignore security as part of risk management and 
resilience. Business schools do not include security as part of the standard CEO 
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education. Although engineering schools have embraced the principles of 
designing for quality, safety and more recently sustainability, they often lack a 
“design for security” focus. In the same  
 
way, academic research centers study many aspects of many industry sectors—
from organization and management to supply chain and product design—but only 
a handful embed concepts of security or risk management into the research 
agenda. They represent a large—and largely untapped—potential to create the 
intellectual content (and metrics) that will drive a paradigm shift toward 
resilience. 
 
Looking Ahead 
Challenge for Companies 
 
The challenge for companies is to overcome a historical perspective that views security 
as static defenses—whether fences or firewalls—and security executives as company 
cops. To the contrary, security must be integrated into the risk management continuum, 
not only for loss avoidance, but also for value creation. (see “Transforming Security into 
a Strategy for Resilience” below) 
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Challenge for Government 
 
The dilemma for public policy is that the “security” in homeland security does not 
necessarily match up to the corporate security function. Arguably, homeland security 
missions are as much about economic resilience as they are about protection. And the 
functional equivalents to the economic resilience mission in the private sector are 
business continuity, disaster management and risk management functions, not just 
security.  
 
Yet, the focus of much of the government’s efforts has been to create public-private 
partnerships that reach out principally to security executives. From a resilience 
perspective, this may not be the logical partnership focus. Moreover, government 
attempts to create a regulatory structure to assure private sector preparedness may 
actually reinforce risk silos, rather than strengthen private sector risk management and 
response capabilities. 
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Warning: Turbulence Ahead 
 
The risk environment has changed dramatically for countries and companies alike. 
Added to the threat of global terrorism are new technical, operational and strategic 
risks: extended supply chains; technological interdependencies; IT vulnerabilities; 
mutating viruses; even weather phenomena. These combine to create the potential 
for disruptions that propagate quickly across technological networks and 
geographic borders. 
 
In fact, many of these emerging trends not only create new 
homeland security challenges, they exacerbate operational 
risks for companies as well—risks that not all companies 
are well-prepared to meet. What the sector studies highlight 
is that the silos in security are characteristic of many 
aspects of operational risk management. Just as security 
functions (physical and employee, IT, supply chain 
security) are siloed, so too are business continuity; safety, 
environment and health; disaster management. 
 
Within these risk specialties, there are, to be sure, very 
sophisticated management processes. The problem is that 
risks do not respect silos. An IT data breach is not just a 
problem for the IT security executive; it can rapidly evolve 
into a reputation risk, a litigation risk and a fi nancial risk 
that can engage the entire company.7 
 
Given some of the turbulence ahead, the lack of an 
integrated approach to risk management is itself becoming a potential risk factor. Some 
of the trends that change the risk that companies face include: 
 
· The Emergence of Global Enterprises 
· New Technology and Infrastructure Risks 
· Evolving Legal and Regulatory Risks 
· Over the Horizon Risks: Energy Volatility and Pandemics 
 
Emergence of Global Enterprises 
Global enterprises of the 21st century are very different from the multinationals of the 
last century. Where multinational companies typically transplanted themselves as self-
contained businesses on foreign shores, global enterprises disperse pieces of their 
business operations across different geographies, which are networked to each other 
through voice and data IT systems and supply chains.  
 
 24 
 
 
The Council’s Competitiveness Index: Where America Stands highlights just how fast the 
U.S. companies are shifting from multinational firms to global enterprises. Sales of U.S. 
foreign subsidiaries dwarf those of their U.S.-based parents—three times higher than U.S. 
exports and even 50 percent higher than 
the trade deficit. (See Chart 5 above)  
 
From a corporate risk perspective, globalization of companies cuts two ways. On one 
hand, companies are able to leverage geography to disperse risk. Indeed, rather than 
creating static backup sites (that often gather dust until a disruption occurs), some of the 
leading companies are rolling out plans to automatically shift operations among global 
hubs, should one site go down. They are creating shadow seats in each of their locations 
and cross-training employees in different geographies to assure business continuity for 
critical functions in case of an emergency. 
 
On the other hand, the diffusion of interconnected operations also increases a company’s 
exposure: to infrastructure disruptions—in transportation, communications, 
information—that enable the enterprise to operate seamlessly across different 
geographies, to the rapid spread of contagious diseases among employees who are 
traveling between sites, and to geo-political instabilities and terrorism. 
 
New Technology and Infrastructure Risks  
 
Infrastructure risks continue to mount as disruptions across networks and catastrophic 
losses escalates. Electric power outages and power quality problems already cost the 
private sector and the nation about $80 billion every year in lost productivity and 
downtime. But when an outage cascaded across multiple transmission systems in the 
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August blackout of 2003, the losses escalated to between $6–10 billion for a single 
incident.8 
 
The Internet is creating an entirely new set of vulnerabilities and risks that many 
companies have not mastered. A recent study indicated that almost seven out of 10 
companies were losing sensitive data or having it stolen out from under them as many as 
six times a year. It turns out that losing data is expensive. Companies that publicly 
reported a data loss or breach had an average of 8 percent loss of revenue.9 
 
The recent Internet attack in Es tonia ushered in a new kind of threat. The attackers used a 
giant network of bots—perhaps as many as one million computers in places as far away 
as the United States and Vietnam—to amplify the impact of their assault.10  One 
cybersecurity expert noted: 
 
“Everything you have seen in hacking up until now has been a Beta Test of what 
is possible. This was a multi-pronged attack against several asset classes and 
financial institutions. What was not widely reported were the digital ripples 
globally: shutdowns of central banks; processing centers; parts of the U.S. and EU 
Treasuries; and other financial elements.”11 
 
Even without data breaches or cyber-attacks, the cost of computer systems going down is 
enormous. The last published analysis of the cost of these kinds of events appears to have 
been conducted seven years ago. In 2000, it was estimated that the cost of an hour of 
downtime for e-Bay was $225,000, for Amazon.com $180,000, and for brokerage 
companies $6,450,000. (These numbers are not only dated, they do not include the cost of 
lost productivity.) 
12 
 
The chart below estimates loss per hour by sector. 
 
 
Evolving Legal and Regulatory Risks 
America’s legal and regulatory environment 
affects companies’ risk calculus in two ways. 
First, the patchwork quilt of laws and 
regulations and inconsistent application in the 
court system raises their cost structure. The 
“direct” cost of liability litigation— including 
damage awards, plaintiff attorneys’ fees, 
defense costs, administrative costs and 
deadweight costs from torts such as product 
liability cases, medical malpractice litigation 
and class action lawsuits—is as much as 2 
percent of GDP. Indeed, the cost of tort litigation has outpaced GDP growth by 2.4 
percent, on average over the last five decades. (See “Growth in Tort Costs,” below.) 
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The combination of uncertainty, costs 
of insurance, and liability litigation is 
having a chilling effect on companies’ 
willingness to take sound business 
risks; to invest in R&D and to deploy 
new technologies, products, and 
processes.13 No one argues that victims 
of incompetence, negligence or 
malfeasance are not entitled to 
compensation. Phillip Howard notes: 
“What has replaced risk is not a culture 
of caution, but one of blame.”14 
 
 
On the regulatory front, new 
governance controls, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, also are having an impact on how 
companies manage risk. Former SEC Chairman Ralph Ferraro noted that companies with 
cash on their balance sheets are increasingly cautious about investing, even in their own 
futures. There are a number of potentially worrisome trends that are not fully understood: 
 
1. the growing number of companies delisting from public stock exchanges 
 
2. the loss of U.S. share of global Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
 
3. the increase in the cost of directors’ liability insurance and new limits on coverage 
 
4. the growing number of companies which no longer provide earnings guidance to 
investors.15 
 
Over the Horizon Risks: Energy Volatility and Pandemics 
Energy could become a significant risk factor. The rapid growth in demand from 
developing economies, such as China and India, is putting pressure on both prices and 
supply. Indeed, the recent volatility in oil, natural gas and electric power has shaved a 
percentage point off U.S. GDP growth, increased the costs of energy for U.S. companies, 
and reduced discretionary income for most Americans.16  
 
Daniel Yergin, chairman of the Cambridge Energy Research Associates, notes that the 
twin energy challenges— the need for energy to drive growth and the need to manage the 
consequences of energy use—will be dominant challenges in the decades ahead. 
 
On the demand side, the magnitude is daunting. Every day, the global economy requires 
86 million barrels of oil, and that is only 40 percent of the total daily world energy 
consumption.17  The supply side risks are growing as well. Investments in low carbon 
alternatives by major financial institutions, energy companies and technology developers 
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could be put at risk if governments around the world fail to agree on an equitable 
framework for allocating carbon emissions.18 
 
Similarly, public health officials have been warning that a future pandemic is not a matter 
of “if” but “when”. The risk of an avian fl u outbreak is growing, according to the 
Congressional Budget Office assessment, because of the way the virus is evolving. 
· It is entrenched among the domestic ducks in rural areas of Asia—a permanent 
ecological niche. 
· It is more robust than a weaker 1997 strain; able to survive longer under a broader 
range of environmental conditions. 
· It has increased the range of species it can infect, including cats and captive tigers. 
It has become resistant to one of the two classes of anti- flu drugs.19 
 
Estimates of the cost of such a pandemic run into the trillions of dollars—costs that could 
be mitigated by advance planning. Yet a recent survey by Deloitte highlighted that 
although 73 percent of businesses are aware of the pandemic flu threat and 68 percent are 
very concerned about the avian fl u, only half believe that they have adequately planned 
to protect themselves from an event—and less than half feel confident about the plan.4 
 
Managing Risk on an Enterprise Basis 
 
Enterprise Risk Management appears to be more popular on paper than in practice. 
Consider that: 
· Only 25 percent of directors of non-financial companies report that the board 
considers all major risks to the company versus 55 percent of financial industry 
directors.21 
· Most companies give themselves high marks in financial risk management, but 
only 29 percent describe their ability to track non-financial performance as 
excellent or good, and more than a third describe it as fair or poor.22 
· During the past 12 months, one in five companies surveyed had suffered 
significant damage from a failure to manage risk and more than half had 
experienced at least one near miss. As many as 10 percent reported three near 
misses during the past year.23 
 
One of the missing links in moving toward an enterprise view of risk is the lack of a 
disciplined approach to operational risk. Notes Joe Sabatini, JP Morgan Chase Managing 
Director and Head of Corporate Operational Risk: “The industry loses money every day 
in credit and market risk. We’re not bothered by that when we take those risks and incur 
those losses on an informed basis. The key is to create the same disciplined approach to 
operational risk.”24 
 
In fact, the lack of a disciplined approach to operational risk increases the potential for 
what Harvard Business School professors Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins call 
“predictable surprise—the disasters you should have seen coming.”25 One example might 
be in the energy area. Most executives recognize that energy is becoming a risk factor, 
but few companies appear to have integrated energy planning into risk management. A 
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recent survey from Hill & Knowlton found that, although 82 percent of senior technology 
leaders from around the globe said they “closely monitor” global warming news, only 35 
percent have a concrete energy strategy to deal with it.26 Similarly, in each of the five 
sectors studied, senior executives clearly understood that the risk dynamic in their 
industry was changing, but few had integrated that knowledge into the company’s risk 
management operations. (see “The Changing Landscape of Risk” on page 28) 
 
Why The Markets Are Not Driving Enterprise 
Risk Management 
 
Given the evidence that integrated risk management is a shareholder value and bottom-
line issue, as well as an asset protection strategy, why aren’t the markets creating new 
standards and best practices that capture management attention though lower risk 
premiums or stronger market valuations? One barrier might be the lack of a common set 
of priorities among the key stakeholders or any commonly accepted metrics. 
 
“Whose Risk?” at right dramatically 
highlights widely divergent views of risk 
between corporate CEOs and insurance 
executives.  Corporate risk managers are 
most concerned about risks to reputation or 
continuity that are often uninsurable, while 
insurance executives are primarily 
concerned with physical damage and losses. 
This could make communication about 
managing risk relatively more difficult. 
 
But the lack of metrics impedes the creation 
of even a baseline for discussion about 
transformational approaches to risk and 
resilience. The lack of risk metrics, 
particularly operational risk metrics, is a show stopper. Insurance companies accept and 
price risk based on actuarial data. But for many types of operational risk, there are no 
actuarial data. Similarly, although Wall Street ratings analysts are increasingly homing in 
on risk management capabilities, they are struggling to come up with appropriate metrics 
and methodologies to assess risk management systems or to value resilience. For its part, 
while the government has a vested interest in creating more robust risk management 
capabilities in the private sector, homeland security generally views risk through the lens 
of catastrophic events and not as part of a risk continuum. 
 
The increasing turbulence of the business environment is partially at fault for the 
slowness of response to mounting risks. When a ceaseless array of day-to-day pressures 
and unexpected crisis bombard executives, it is difficult to step back and develop an 
integrated strategy. In a simpler time, companies were able to achieve operating 
efficiency by establishing stable business models with repeatable, uniform processes. 
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Today, stability is elusive, and companies must learn new skills—agility, adaptability, 
and resilience—in order to deliver consistently high performance and shareholder value. 
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Ratcheting Up Resilience: Best 
Practices Among the Leaders 
 
The challenges are mounting, but so too is the amount of ingenuity being applied to 
meet them. Innovative organizations are fielding new ideas and deploying new 
solutions that increase both their risk intelligence and capacity for resilience. 
DuPont is building a new framework for integrated risk management that brings 
with it a leadership vision to walk the talk. Georgetown University serves as a model 
for academic institutions in terms of reaping rewards from effective risk 
management. FM Global’s systems approach provides a model for meeting 
emerging types of risks, while NASDAQ has embraced reliability as a cultural goal. 
Companies like Wal-Mart, Waste Management, AEP, Educational Testing Service 
and Limited Brands are paving the way with success stories and best practices that 
serve both competitiveness and homeland security goals. 
 
1. Best Practice: Walk the Talk at the Top 
 
Enterprise risk management requires an enterprisewide approach, and that means that the 
impetus for change has to come from the top. The first steps are to connect the 
organizational silos and embed risk management in day-to-day business operations, to 
engage the entire workforce, and to create cultural change. 
 
Case in Point: Risk Management Done Right at DuPont 
 
The growing complexity of risk has triggered a transformation restructuring of risk 
management at DuPont. Ten, even twenty years ago, addressing one risk at a time 
worked pretty well. Today, risks that weren’t even on the radar screen a decade ago—
global warming and carbon caps, Sarbanes-Oxley, to name a few—have a profound 
impact on business performance. The world has gotten too complicated to take one risk at 
a time. They have to be rolled up into a risk portfolio. So, DuPont is creating a new work 
process and leadership structure that integrates risk management across the entire 
enterprise. Principles guiding the transformation include: 
 
Understanding the big picture on risk enables the company to prioritize which to accept, 
which to transfer, which to manage—and which to eliminate.  
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In this more complex world of interdependent risks, gut instinct and managerial 
experience are no longer sufficient. New risk structures demand fully integrated business 
teams that bring every perspective to the table in strategic decision-making. In addition, 
knowledge management systems have become critical to capture and share information 
and insights within the company about risks and risk management processes. 
 
Understanding the bigger picture is its own reward. It enables DuPont to capitalize on 
strategic opportunities with a more complete understanding of all the potential risks. That 
process requires clarity of goals and transparent processes to achieve them—increasingly 
a critical factor in relations with shareholders, customers, communities and employees. 
And the integrated approach to risk creates insight into workflow and supply chain 
efficiency, ultimately resulting in better business performance. 
 
2. Best Practice: Treat Risk as a Cont inuum 
 
One of the limitations of most organizations is that risks are managed in silos, not 
strategically. Emergency preparedness is handled separately from business continuity, 
which in turn is not always part of strategic risk management. This fragmented approach 
impedes a clear understanding of the tradeoffs between different risk management 
strategies (avoid, accept, mitigate, transfer) and the different kinds of investments that 
can be made to implement those strategies. 
 
Case in Point: Georgetown University—Managing Risk Strategically 
 
Georgetown realized that traditional risk approaches had become too limiting. Consider, 
for example, a specific operating risk—say a facility fi re. Under a traditional framework, 
facilities management, safety, and insurance could each be independently making 
investment decisions to protect against risk. This piecemeal approach could result in 
over- investment, under- investment and almost certainly, inefficient investment. 
 
Georgetown re-organized its risk management processes as a continuum.  
 
The integrated framework enables the university to capture the business returns on 
effective risk management. Georgetown University began by mapping its core missions 
and revenue streams and working backward to understand what key risks could disrupt 
them. 
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Take, for example, education and the associated tuition, which provides one of the 
University’s main sources of operating revenue. In this context, student housing is a 
critical function. If it isn’t available, neither is the revenue stream. Georgetown undertook 
a project to improve residence hall safety standards that exceeded code—installing 
sprinklers and other equipment—resulting in a significant decrease in its insurance 
premiums. The University then took these savings and increased its business interruption 
insurance fivefold (well before Katrina). That turned out to be a positive factor in 
determining the University’s 
cost of capital in a recent bond issue. 
 
This kind of dynamic business model doesn’t happen by accident. It requires a risk 
management approach that is: 
 
· Integrative: Creating a single framework to address the continuum of risks and 
responses at the strategic level.  
· Quantitative: Applying performance metrics to understand the impacts of 
different types of responses, and the ability to meet rare but high impact 
contingencies 
· Systematic: Taking a systems engineering approach to address multiple 
interacting risks and focus on solutions that combine business payback with risk 
reduction.  
 
And, it creates one key advantage. In adopting a capabilities-based approach rather than a 
scenario-based, threat model, Georgetown is evolving its focus on how it approaches 
business continuity— reinforcing the most critical assets and functions needed to deliver 
the revenue stream—rather than what- if contingencies. The university may not be able to 
anticipate every scenario, but it is trying to create response capabilities that will be 
resilient no matter what the cause of disruption. 
 
3. Best Practice: Taking a Systems Approach 
 
Business continuity requires a systems approach that identifies potential weak links and 
how disruption might unfold throughout the organization. Sometimes, the ability to map 
business continuity not only helps to understand the modes of failure, but it clarifies 
business processes in ways that enhance efficiency or streamline costs. 
 
Case in Point: FM Global—Managing Risk and 
Minimizing Loss 
 
Terrorists and black-hat hackers may evoke powerful concerns among corporate risk 
managers, but one-third of U.S. GDP is directly affected by weather. Indirect effects, like 
downed phone or power lines, can throw a wrench into a company’s operations and 
business continuity.  
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Business property insurance giant, FM Global, believes that it is better to prevent a loss 
than to try to recover from one. Its motto: Hurricanes cannot be stopped…but losses can. 
The insurance provider has adopted a systems engineering approach to risk management 
that minimizes physical damage and downtime. 
 
The company built a $78 million research campus that specializes in destruction by such 
things as fire, explosion, high winds and golf-ball sized hail. Roofing tiles are slammed 
by ice balls exceeding 70 miles an hour. A giant fan creates hurricane-force winds with 
speeds of up to 160 miles an hour. A debris cannon shoots two-by-fours up to 90 miles an 
hour at walls, windows and doors to see what happens when debris is tossed around in a 
storm. The campus also features a dust explosion bunker used to demonstrate how 
quickly airborne particles can ignite and create an explosion, and an electrical hazards lab 
to test explosion-proof and flame-proof products.  
 
Nearly one third of its workforce consists of loss prevention engineers. As an insurer of 
one in three FORTUNE 1000 companies, FM Global believes that an engineering-based 
loss prevention strategy works better than an actuarial approach. In fact, locations that 
implemented the company’s engineering recommendations during the 2004 and 2005 
hurricane season sustained approximately eight times less damage than those that did not. 
Its advice to Ocean Spray provides a useful example. 
 
Calculating that a major hurricane could potentially create a $75 million to $100 million 
loss, Ocean Spray sought help in securing its Florida-based, grapefruit-processing 
operation. Ocean Spray invested in securing the sections of buildings most vulnerable to 
high winds and purchasing back-up generators for use in the event of a power outage. 
During the wild 2004 hurricane season when the plant took direct hits from two of the 
four major hurricanes that struck the Florida coastline, the total systems approach paid 
off. The facilities sustained only superficial damage during two major storms and the 
generators prevented spoilage of the grapefruit inventory. 
 
The Message :  Insurance alone is not enough to make your company whole when disaster 
strikes. You can insure your assets against physical loss, but insurance won’t bring back 
lost opportunities or market share. 
 
4. Best Practice: Manage with Metrics 
 
It is often said that you manage what you can measure. A resilient enterprise needs to 
adopt a common definition of resilience and measurement framework that supports the 
operational and cultural values of the organization. An enterprise must quantify just how 
resilient it is before adopting strategies to improve or leverage resilience. 
 
Case in Point: Educational Testing Service— 
Measuring Resiliency 
 
Many organizations are actively searching for metrics to assess their operational risk 
exposure and resilience.  The Educational Testing Service (ETS)—an organization that 
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administers and scores more than 50 million tests annually in more than 180 countries—
is already implementing them. As a nonprofit institution with a core competency in 
measuring performance, ETS has established a framework not only to understand how 
resilient the enterprise is, but to leverage its resiliency when assessing new ventures and 
opportunities. For ETS, the roadmap to enterprise resilience runs through three phases: 
 
Phase 1: Establish a resiliency baseline  
 
Conduct a detailed assessment of specific resiliency elements and observations across 
eight dimensions: 
· Resiliency Goals 
· Governance and Compliance 
· Organizational Command and Control 
· Reliability Strategies 
· Continuity and Resumption 
· Information Management and Protection 
· Technology Redundancy and Recovery 
· Facilities Safety, Security and Dependability 
 
 
Compare the results to a “straw man” position of where management thought the 
organization was and where it needed to be. Score the results to determine a baseline 
resiliency quotient or rating. In and of itself, this rating is not very meaningful.  
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However, it establishes a starting point, or baseline, where activities and resources can be 
prioritized and progress measured. An example resilience assessment is shown in Chart 7, 
above.  
 
Phase 2: Improve Operational Resiliency 
 
Identify gaps and adopt solutions to address them. Implement policy, procedural and 
organizational changes, and prioritize resources to address high- leverage areas where the 
greatest improvements can be made. Consider solutions based on their specific 
contribution to improving overall enterprise resiliency. Measure annual objectives as the 
bar is raised. 
 
Phase 3: Capture strategic opportunities and competitive advantages from a 
comprehensive enterprise resiliency program 
 
New business Significant new contracts have been won by demonstrating a commitment 
to enterprise resiliency. The competitiveness of ETS bids and proposals has been 
enhanced by offering operational resilience as a feature of its products and services. 
 
Supply chain A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Having strong and resilient 
partners and suppliers improves overall enterprise resiliency. New vendors and suppliers 
can be assessed against the internal enterprise resiliency quotient. Their rating becomes a 
key criterion for negotiation and ultimate selection. 
 
Acquisition Just as a CARFAX or bond rating can assist with the value of and decision to 
buy an automobile or a junk-bond, a resiliency rating can identify and illuminate areas of 
strength or concern of a potential acquisition or business partner. During the diligence 
phase, the resiliency assessment can compare elements of the target on an “apples-to-
apples” basis and determine the incremental effect to the overall enterprise resiliency of 
the combined organization, product or service. 
 
The Message :  Enterprise resiliency, when institutionalized into the operations and 
culture of an organization, can provide strategic competitive advantage and confidence to 
pursue new opportunities. 
 
5. Best Practice: Harness Technology to Reinforce 
Resilience 
 
Technology creates new vulnerabilities, but strategic applications of technology also can 
reinforce a company’s ability to anticipate problems, weather turbulence and respond to 
crises. Nowhere is this more evident than in the IT arena. Organizations that focus on 
protecting the keys to the kingdom (increasingly their data and IT systems)—and use that 
capability to monitor their operations—do better across a variety of measures: security, 
business continuity, efficiency and customer confidence. 
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Case in Point: Resilience NASDAQ style 
 
Resilience requirements do not get much more complicated than those at NASDAQ. 
Launched in 1971, the world’s first electronic stock exchange now provides data to more 
than 400,000 terminals and workstations, connecting thousands of traders across North 
America. It processes more than 230 million transactions daily at a rate of 64,000 
transactions per second, each with a 1 millisecond response time. In the time it takes to 
read this sentence, NASDAQ will process nearly 200,000 transactions. 
 
Resilience wasn’t always a NASDAQ byword. In fact, one of the earliest challenges was 
the local squirrel population. In 1984, a squirrel knocked out a power line and the battery-
powered backup system failed to kick in, causing a 30-minute trading disruption. Again, 
in 1987, a squirrel triggered a power surge in a transformer, which brought down the 
network for 82 minutes—and the losses mount into the millions by the minute, not the 
hour or the trading day. 
 
Today, NASDAQ operates at what they call the “4 nines of uptime”—99.998 percent or 
about as close to zero room for error as anyone can get. Twenty years of engineering its 
IT systems, emergency operations and contingency planning came to a head on 9/11. 
 
Despite the shock of a front row seat to the tragedy unfolding at the World Trade Center, 
the NASDAQ exchange remained open and operational throughout the day. The problem: 
Many of its customers’ systems, that had to connect to NASDAQ electronically, were 
down. In fact, during the week of 9/11, the NASDAQ system operated continuously so 
that customer firms could test their connectivity in preparation for the resumption in 
trading. 
 
The Message :  The big lesson from 9/11 was that operational readiness has to exist in a 
practical sense—not just on paper or in emergency operations centers that are essentially 
gathering dust—and it has to engage the entire industry, not just the NASDAQ exchange. 
More frequent and more inclusive testing is now a big part of their resilience planning. 
Quarterly testing of backup sites turned into monthly tests involving select market 
participants. Disaster recovery tests are now conducted multiple times in a year with 
NASDAQ’s customers and key service providers.  
 
The 2003 August blackout created another key learning opportunity. In a quarter century 
of NASDAQ operations, the blackout represented the first time that both northeast 
utilities failed. Although a diesel powered backup generator in Connecticut kept the 
exchange operational, the implications for resilience were not lost—that is, the desire to 
achieve increased operational efficiency through consolidation of data centers has to be 
balanced against the need for geographic diversity to manage infrastructure risks. 
 
Wall Street has clearly learned some valuable lessons during the past few years. One of 
the most important: There is an extremely tight correlation between money, profits and 
resilience. 
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6. Best Practice: Put Plans in Place that Anticipate 
 
With so many different permutations of things that can go wrong, it is impossible to plan 
for every contingency. The leader companies are putting plans in place to manage 
outcomes, rather than specific scenarios. They are creating a capabilities-based approach. 
 
Case in Point: Protecting Supply Channels: Resilience at the Limited Brands  
 
No industry sector is more challenged by rapid change and unpredictability than the 
global apparel industry. At Limited Brands, which operates Victoria’s Secret, Bath & 
Body Works, and a number of other well-known retail chains, resilience is ingrained into 
the culture. 
 
Limited Logistics Services (LLS) is a division of the company that provides integrated 
management of global supply chain operations for all of the brands. Since the 9/11 crisis, 
resilience has become standard operating procedure for LLS. They rely on a number of 
key strengths—continuous vigilance, contingency planning, cross-functional teamwork, 
frequent communication, and an adaptive, problem solving approach. These strengths 
were evident during the September, 2002 port shutdown on the West Coast, which 
disrupted the supply chain operations of many U.S. companies. Recognizing the potential 
for a disruption, LLS began to work with the various Limited Brands businesses on risk 
avoidance tactics to identify new and alternative distribution channels. 
 
The port shutdown was a prolonged test of Limited Brands’ resilience; a dynamic, ever-
changing situation requiring daily assessments and decision-making. As a result of this 
experience, LLS gained credibility for their expertise in crisis management, and they are 
now a key player in Limited Brands’ efforts to further strengthen its emergency 
preparedness and enterprise risk management capabilities. 
 
The capacity to “sense and respond” across the supply chain continues to be reinforced as 
a standard operating procedure. LLS avoids getting locked into a single scenario of how 
things should be. Instead, they confront uncertainties and constantly question their 
assumptions. Individuals are encouraged to think holistically, not just focus on narrow 
cost or efficiency criteria. According to Rick Jackson, the vice president that oversaw the 
2002 crisis: “Resilience goes beyond conventional business continuity and security—it is 
an intuitive mindset that pervades our organization.”27 
 
Case in Point: Resilience at American Electric 
Power—A Leader in Emergency Response 
 
When the electricity doesn’t work, it is not just the lights that go out. Information, 
communications, transportation, water and sewer networks all depend on the availability 
of electric power at some point in their production or delivery process. Virtually all 
service providers and every retail cash register in the country depend on electricity.  
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The electric power industry has become best in class in recovering from localized, 
usually weather related, disruptions that affect every region in the country—and none 
better than American Electric Power (AEP). AEP is a recognized leader in the field of 
emergency response, often helping companies outside of its own service areas. 
 
AEP’s resilience was tested on January 12, 2007, when a severe ice storm struck several 
communities in the territory served by Public Service Company of Oklahoma (PSO), an 
AEP operating company based in Tulsa. The storm came in three successive waves 
during a period of several days, depositing up to two inches of ice. Ultimately, the storm 
interrupted electrical service for close to 250,000 customers, with some customers losing 
power for more than 10 days. 
 
To respond to such disruptions, AEP has evolved an elaborate, company-wide system, 
governed by a detailed Service Restoration Plan that is updated continually. Additionally, 
it is common for AEP and other utilities to provide emergency support to each other, 
coordinated through “mutual assistance networks” involving dozens of regional utility 
companies. During the Oklahoma event, PSO requested assistance and was able to 
promptly mobilize more than 2,000 emergency workers. After such an event, the affected 
utilities reimburse those that provide restoration service. 
 
The coordination required to manage and support these emergency resources is an 
enormously complex task. Outside contractors are often utilized; AEP contracts with 
forestry companies to clear branches for line crews and with logistics companies to 
supply tents, trailers, food, and laundry services. AEP has adopted advanced 
technologies, such as handheld data entry and communication devices, to help dispatch 
crews quickly to the areas of greatest need. Satellite positioning devices are being 
installed on line repair trucks so that resources can be monitored centrally and deployed 
in real time. 
 
The Service Restoration Plan lays out a detailed organizational structure, with different 
levels of responsibility. Voluntary participation—all hands on deck—is part of the AEP 
culture. During an emergency, it is not unusual for more than 75 percent of employees in 
the affected operating company to be engaged. 
 
Each person receives an alternative “storm” assignment. For example, Hazard Standby 
Associates are assigned to guard broken wires in order to prevent residents from being 
injured. AEP provides standardized training and materials so that different operating 
companies can collaborate effectively. 
 
According to AEP Chief Risk Officer Laura Thomas, the company’s emphasis on reliable 
service delivery is essential to assuring customer satisfaction, since “AEP is part of the 
business continuity plan for every company we serve.” AEP Emergency Restoration 
Planning Manager Jim Nowak adds: “Restoring power is not just a responsibility, it’s a 
moral imperative.” 
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7. Best Practice: Create Cutting Edge Research 
Centers  
 
It is tempting to believe that 9/11 was a watershed event that changed America’s 
economic, homeland and national security. But the reality is that many threads have 
converged to create a new landscape of global risk. U.S. competitiveness, as well as 
security, depends on being able to understand and manage these risks. Our universities 
will play a critical role in developing the framework for understanding resilience and 
training a new generation of Americans to deal with an inherently riskier future. 
 
Case in Point: Resilience at Ohio State 
 
Known as a Big Ten sports powerhouse, The Ohio State University (OSU) campus in 
Columbus, Ohio, also is the first university in the nation to launch a Center for Resilience 
(CfR), dedicated to strengthening the resilience of enterprise systems and the 
environments in which they operate.  
 
The university saw a growing gap between the real world challenges of enterprise 
management and the analytical tools available for understanding complex, adaptive 
systems. Companies that use traditional methods of risk analysis and decision-making 
often find themselves in a continuous crisis mode, unable to cope with a rapidly changing 
business environment. The multidisciplinary center is focusing on introducing new 
analytic tools and methodologies, for example: 
· A web-based supply chain resilience assessment protocol, developed with Limited 
Brands, which enables companies to identify supply chain vulnerabilities and 
enhance their capabilities.  
 
· A decision model for design of industrial networks incorporating innovative 
technologies that enable conversion of waste materials and energy into profitable 
byproduct streams.  
 
· An approach for building resilient organizations that can make effective decisions 
under pressure, such as when confronted with tradeoffs between safety and 
performance. 
 
· A comprehensive life cycle analysis tool that captures the linkages between 
industrial and ecological systems, such as the hidden dependence of fuel 
production on ecosystem services.  
 
A key step in the formation of the Center was the recruitment of an industrial advisory 
board, with senior representatives from companies such as American Electric Power, 
Chevron, Dow Chemical, General Motors, and Limited Brands, as well as government 
agencies and non-profits. 
 
Center Co-Director Joseph Fiksel points out that short-term business continuity and long-
term sustainability are two ends of the resilience spectrum. 
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According to Fiksel, there are several ways that companies can improve their resilience, 
including re-engineering their physical assets, improving their human-centered business 
processes, and strengthening their position with respect to the “competitive context”—the 
social and environmental assets that provide employee talent, market demand, and a 
reliable supply of materials and energy. 
 
Addressing resilience in an integrated manner will require breaking down a large number 
of functional silos and creating new management tools. But universities can be key 
partners in providing the research and new curricula to make this happen. 
 
Much more can be done to capture best practices and the measurement systems that 
demonstrate their effectiveness. 
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Policy Priorities 
 
When it comes to homeland security, there are some jobs that only the government 
can do, such as intelligence and border control. But there also is a critical aspect of 
the homeland security challenge that is less about security and more about economic 
resilience: the capacity to minimize disruption and recover quickly. The distinction 
is critical. 
 
Making a case for businesses to invest large amounts in static defenses against low-
probability events is never an easy sell to shareholders. But making the business 
case for investment in business continuity and risk management doesn’t require 
much heavy lifting. The following vignettes highlight just how far investments by 
some of the nation’s leading companies in supply chain agility, physical security, 
information security, business continuity, risk management and risk measurement 
capabilities—investments that were made to serve their own business needs and 
bottom-lines—actually go toward meeting national objectives. 
 
Government policies can reinforce resilience in some key ways: incentivizing 
investments in resilience through the power of government procurement contracts; 
identifying resilience as a desired criteria in research and development funding; 
strengthening market mechanisms to reward companies with stronger risk 
management capabilities; investing in new computational models, that is, analytic 
tools that improve risk assessment capabilities; encouraging regional information-
sharing networks that support disaster-resistant communities; leveraging public-
private partnerships to reduce the cost and risks of deploying new security 
technologies; and funding new programs to embed resilience in America’s research 
agenda and educational curricula. 
 
Lead by Incentive 
 
Leverage the government’s buying clout to embed resilience criteria into 
procurement processes and supply chains  
 
The government should never underestimate its ability to influence the private sector 
through the procurement system, which spends about $400 billion annually on goods and 
services. The government could leverage that buying power to create resilience 
requirements for its contractors. 
 
In fact, private sector entities are already developing model contract language for use 
with their own vendors and through their own supply chains. The Internet Security 
Alliance and the American National Standards Institute have proposed language that 
incorporates globally recognized IT security management practices into contract-based 
business operations. Similarly, the SCADA Procurement Project, a joint effort between 
the public and private sectors, is focused on developing common procurement language 
 42 
to help ensure that best in class security standards are integrated into the computer 
systems that control critical infrastructures and plant operating systems. The chemical 
industry is developing standards to require industry security and responsible conduct 
codes for use in its own supply chains. If the private sector can embed resilience into its 
supply chains, the public sector should do no less. 
 
Leverage the government’s investments in technology to embed resilience criteria 
into the evaluation and selection of emerging technologies. 
 
In each of the five industry sectors, senior business executives could imagine future 
technologies that would make their operations inherently more resilient and robust. Some 
of these technologies are already in the research and development pipeline of federal 
agencies, but none were evaluated on the basis of their contribution to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure resiliency. 
 
Among the most promising future technologies for both competitiveness and resilience 
identified by private sector leaders were: self-optimizing grids; advanced pipeline 
technologies; smart refineries; small, just-in-time chemical processing; and renewable 
raw materials. 
 
• Self-Optimizing Grids  
 
Self-optimizing transmission grids have the ability to self-diagnose and “heal” the system 
in real-time. They make use of advances in grid technology to detect and locate damage 
in the transmission network, incorporating autonomic system reconfiguration in response 
to disruptions and fluctuations in supply and demand. This increases the efficiency of the 
entire power system and lowers the cost of delivery, maintenance and repair, as well as 
the cost of blackouts for suppliers and consumers. 
 
• Advanced Pipeline Technologies 
 
Recent developments in pipelines maintenance and secur ity technology facilitate faster 
recovery from attacks while enabling cost-effective and efficient pipeline maintenance 
procedures. These technologies incorporate the ability to detect precisely the location and 
the severity of pipeline damage as soon as a security event occurs, essentially reducing 
repair and maintenance costs while increasing reliability. 
 
• Smart Refineries 
 
Smart refineries would combine the latest developments in computer and 
communications technologies to capture comprehensive and frequent measurements of 
operating conditions. These real-time measurements—collected from motors and valves 
that provide data on temperature, flux, run-times, pressure, and sensors with 
photographic, audiometric near infra-red (INR) and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) 
imaging—are analyzed and compared to previously collected data and outputs of 
sophisticated forecasting models to realize the differences between the actual and 
 43 
expected states. The technology not only increases efficiency and creates a capacity for 
predictive maintenance models, but can monitor attacks, accidents or disruption in real 
time and potentially reduce the scope of damage. 
 
• Small, Just-In-Time Chemical Processing 
 
One promising technology option is process intensification, which combines different 
processes into smaller, compact and efficient units that can also be co- located at the 
manufacturing site. The pay-off is not only in streamlined processes, but in a much 
smaller environmental footprint and the potential to transport non-hazardous materials to 
a co-located facilities where it can be processed on site in a just- in-time mode. From a 
homeland security perspective, this keeps the toxic products off the road and co- located 
at the manufacturing facility. 
 
• Renewable Raw Materials 
 
Replacing oil-based raw materials with locally available renewable agricultural 
feedstocks creates another long-term vision for future resilience. Such a capability would 
create a reduction in the cost-of-goods while eliminating a major source of security risk, 
in addition to providing clear environmental and sustainability benefits. 
 
Leverage Market Incentives More Creatively 
 
• Expand guidance on disclosure of non-financial material risks in SEC filings 
 
The year is 1998 and Y2K concerns are taking hold. SEC chairman Arthur Levitt sends a 
letter to executives at more than 9,000 publicly traded companies that states: 
 
“At midnight on December 31, 1999, the vast majority of computer systems may not be 
able to distinguish the year 2000 from the year 1900. Many experts fear that this 
programming fl aw could debilitate computer systems world wide…Time is 
short…Because the lack of information regarding your preparations for the year 2000 
could seriously undermine the confidence investors place in your company, it is 
imperative that you provide thorough, meaningful disclosure on this topic.”28 
 
In the Y2K case, the SEC did not ask companies to expose their vulnerabilities, but rather 
to disclose their readiness to deal with the risk. Today, the capabilities to protect against 
disruption as well as rebound from it are becoming increasingly relevant to shareholder 
value and future earnings.   
 
There are some clear parallels between the Y2K example and the rise in operational risks. 
Companies may not be able to project a specific probability of risk, but they can certainly 
disclose more about whether risk management processes are enterprisewide, anticipatory 
across a spectrum of contingencies and based on performance metrics. Understanding a 
company’s risk readiness is likely to become far more material to investors as a predictor 
of future earnings. 
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Create More Effective Partnerships: Reduce Risk and Cost 
 
• Fund additional research to apply computational modeling and simulation 
capabilities to assessments of operational risk 
 
One of America’s technological advantages is its strong leadership in computational 
modeling and high performance computers. These computational capabilities, resident 
today in America’s universities and national laboratories, could be applied to creating 
more sophisticated operational risk management tools. 
 
The financial side of risk management already employs high performance computers and 
sophisticated algorithms to assess risk exposure. But there is no comparable 
computational capability for operational risk, which is, in fact, a far more complex 
challenge. 
 
Operational risk is sometimes defined by what it does not include (e.g. market risk, credit 
risk, and liquidity risk). But it does include almost everything else, with some key risk 
areas being: system, supply chain, technology or infrastructure breakdowns; employee 
fraud or misconduct; security breaches; natural disasters; industrial accidents; and worker 
safety. 
 
With better modeling capabilities, the interrelationship between different types of 
operational risk, their potential failure paths, and the company’s exposure to loss can be 
modeled and quantified —data which might motivate CEOs and boards to action. Such 
models have been developed for complex engineering challenges, but could be equally 
relevant in modeling multiple interacting operational risks. 
 
This is one area in which leveraging investment that the federal government has 
supported for the past four decades could have a huge impact on the private sector’s 
ability to deploy more sophisticated risk management processes, while serving both 
competitiveness as well as homeland security goals. 
 
• Create regional networks to exchange information on infrastructure or system risk 
management, crisis planning and preparedness, non-proprietary best practices and 
intelligence- sharing between the public and private sectors  
 
Governor Tom Ridge famously noted that homeland security is based on hometown 
security. Community risk management really comes together at the grassroots, where 
companies come together with infrastructure providers, universities research centers and 
training programs, emergency responders, and government executives. It is at the 
grassroots where the fusion of interests and responsibilities creates the potential for 
fruitful exchanges of information and best practices. 
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Although fusion centers were originally proposed as vehicles for information and 
intelligence sharing among federal, state and local officials, the value of regional 
networks goes far beyond the original concept. 
 
Collaborative regional centers could provide needed exchanges of information between 
companies and their infrastructure providers on redundancies in the service and 
interdependencies between the networks; create regular communications paths between 
first responders and local businesses (who also have a vested interest in quick recovery 
and business continuity); provide a venue for sharing ideas and best practices on a non-
proprietary basis; explore new crisis management options; and serve as a test bed for 
exercising current crisis plans. 
 
The focus on terrorism and criminal activity of the original fusion centers is simply too 
narrow. These centers could serve as a focal point for creating disaster-resistant 
communities and the bridge between the public and private sectors to meet a spectrum of 
risks and contingencies. 
 
• Expand the program of technology test beds, such as the DOE SCADA test bed, 
that help companies test innovative security solutions and their interface with 
current operating systems  
 
The Department of Energy understood that the country and companies alike faced a 
critical threat in the Internet-accessible systems that controlled the production, generation 
and transmission of the nation’s energy resources. 
 
Unfortunately, the threats were not theoretical. In 1997, a teenager hacked in and 
remotely disabled part of a public switching network, disrupting phone service to local 
residents and causing a malfunction at a nearby airport. In 2001, a former employee of a 
software developer hacked into a sewage plant in Australia, triggering a large sewage 
discharge. In 2003, the Slammer Worm infi ltrated the operations network of a nuclear 
power plant via a high speed connection from an unsecured contractor’s network. 
Migrating from the business to the operations network, the worm disabled a panel used to 
monitor the plant’s most crucial safety indicators for about 5 hours and caused the plant’s 
process computer to fail. 
 
Rather than regulate a security standard, the DOE created a win-win solution that 
encouraged market-based solutions. Through its SCADA test-bed, DOE created an 
opportunity for companies to test any glitches between their security software and 
operating systems in a simulated environment, before actually deploying the software. 
The ultimate effect of the test bed is to reduce the costs and risks of deploying new, more 
secure SCADA systems. (See “Government Collaboration Boosts the Nation’s 
Resiliency,” next page.) 
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Education and Training: Change the Culture  
 
• Establish a Resilience Curriculum Fund under which universities and other 
education/training providers could apply for competitively awarded grants to 
develop resilience courses and training programs—either stand-alone or embedded 
in existing curricula 
 
 
Universities can play a pivotal role in creating new undergraduate and professional 
education curricula that ensures tomorrow’s leaders will be well grounded in the 
principles of resilience and risk management. 
 
Today, the cross-disciplinary understanding required for resilience is absent from most of 
the curricula. Business school programs do not emphasize the link between operational 
risk (often thought of as an engineering problem) and revenues. Engineering schools have 
embraced the principles of design for quality or safety, but they often lack a design for 
resilience focus. Security executives typically don’t speak the language of finance. 
Enterprise wide risk management and resilience should be part of the graduate school 
curricula, and must become a core concept within graduate school curricula in business, 
engineering and public policy. 
 
• Stimulate cross-disciplinary synthesis of resilience research. 
 
The concept of resilience in complex and dynamic systems cuts across multiple 
disciplines, including many of the sciences, economics, ecology, psychology, sociology 
and network theory. It is cutting edge to understand how to deal with challenge and 
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change in many types of systems; it is an emerging fi eld that transcends traditional 
disciplines in the universities. Research programs that model resilience can be responsive 
to the more practical needs of industry and government, because they create linkages 
among security, complex interdependencies, crisis management and risk management 
options. But the same tools can be used to study resilience, robustness and adaptability in 
other complex systems and environmental ecosystems. 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1) Chad Holliday and Jared Cohon, co-chairs Council on Competitiveness Steering Committee 
on Competitiveness and Security.  First Security and Competitiveness Symposium, Council 
on Competitiveness.   
 
2) Definition adopted from Center for Resilience, The Ohio State University. 
 
3)  Deloitte Research, “Disarming the Value Killers.” Deloitte, February 2006 
 
4) K.B. Hendricks & V. R. Singhal “An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supply-Chain 
Disruptions on Long-Run Stock Price Performance and Risk of the Firm.” Productions and 
Operations Management. 14 (2005) 35-52.  In FMGlobal, “The New Supply Chain Challenge: 
Risk Management in a Global Economy.” (April, 2006) 
 
5) Economist Intelligence Unit. “Business Resilience: Ensuring Continuity in a Volatile 
Environment.” The Economist. 2007. Citing a U.S. National Archives study. 
 
6) Gary Hamel and Liisa Valikangas “The Quest For Resilience.” Harvard Business Review. 
September 2003. 
 
7) Deloitte Research.“The Risk Intelligent Chief Audit Executive.” Risk Intelligence Series.  
Issue No. 5. Deloitte, May 2007. 
 
8) Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory: Kristina Hamachi-LaCommare and Joe Eto. 
“Understanding the Cost of Power Interruptions to U.S. Electricity Consumers.”  Berkley: 
U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electric Transmission and Distribution. 
 
9) Lisa Vasas. “Some Companies Lose Data Six Times a Year.” EWeek. March 7 2007.  June 6, 
1995. http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2101683,00.asp 
 
10) Landler and John Markoff. “After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Turns to Cyberspace.”  
New York Times. May 29, 2007, Final, Technology.  June 5, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html 
 
11) Stephen Spoonamore.  Cybrinth:CEO.  May 29, 2007. 
. 
12) David A. Patterson. “A Simple Way to Estimate the Cost of Downtime.” The Proceedings of 
LISA 2002: Sixteenth Systems Administration Conference. Berkley: Berkley USENIX 
Association, 2002. Pp. 185-188 
 48 
 
13) Peter W. Huber and Robert Litan. The Liability Maze: The Impact of Law on Safety and 
Innovation.  Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1991.  
 
14) Philip K. Howard. “Danger!” Chicago: Mckinsey and Company, 2004. June 5, 2007. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/ideas/wef2004/riskcontrol/PDF/mckinsey_ris k_howard.pdf 
 
15) Council on Competitiveness. “Innovate America” Washington D.C.: Council on 
Competitiveness, 2004. 
 
16) Council on Competitiveness. “Energy Security, Innovation and Sustainability Initiative” 
Washington D.C.: Council on Competitiveness, May 2007. 
 
17) Daniel Yergin.  “Energy’s Challenges.” Forbes.com.  April 23, 2007.  June 5, 2007. 
<http://www.forbes.com/opinions/2007/04/23/solutions-energy-yergin-opinion-
cx_lm_0423yergin.html> 
 
18) CERA Insights. “Carbon Markets: Globally Warming.” CERA, April 2007. 
 
19) Congressional Budget Office.  “A Potential Influenza Pandemic: Possible Macroeconomic 
Effects and Policy Issues.” Washington D.C.: U.S. Congress, July 2006 
 
20) Deloitte Research. “Year Two Pandemic Preparedness Survey Results.” Deloitte, December 
2006. 
 
21) Conference Board, CEO Challenge, 2006. 
 
22) Deloitte Research. “In the Dark II” Deloitte, 2007. 
 
23) Lloyd’s, In Association with the Economic Intelligence Unit. “Taking Risk On Board.” 
London: Lloyd’s, 2006. 
 
24) Neil Davey.  “Operational Risk: A Disciplined Approach.” First Services Technology.  June 
5, 2007. 
 
25) Max. H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins.  Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You 
Should Have Seen Coming, and How to Prevent Them. Cambridge: Harvard Business School 
Press, 2004. 
 
26) Hill and Knowlton, “Return on Environment” New York: Hill and Knowlton, April, 2007.  
June 5, 2007 <http://www.greenbiz.com/news/news_third. cfm?NewsID=35038>  
 
27) Limited Brands is a sponsor of The Center for Resilience at The Ohio State University, where 
this case study was developed. 
 
28) http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/y2k/y2kletter.htm  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
 
 
